Labor Law: Supreme Court Provides an Imprimatur for Expanded Protection of the Parochial Interests of Private Disputants Under the NLRA by unknown
LABOR LAW: SUPREME COURT PROVIDES AN
IMPRIMATUR FOR EXPANDED PROTECTION OF THE
PAROCHIAL INTERESTS OF PRIVATE DISPUTANTS
UNDER THE NLRA
The Supreme Court held that a party wholly successful in an
unfair labor practice proceeding before the NLRB has a right to
intervene in appellate review or enforcement proceedings. The
Court recognized the existence of strong, albeit subordinate, private
interests under the NLRA and seemingly utilized a balancing test
to determine the nature and extent of the protection to be accorded
such interests. The reasoning employed may also presage ex-
panded procedural and remedial protection for private interests
at every adjudicatory level.
AT Th E TIME of the enactment of the National Labor Relations
Act,1 the Labor Board created by that statute was viewed as "the
custodian of the 'public interest' to the exclusion of the so-called
'private interests' at stake.' 2 One procedural manifestation of this
philosophy has been a refusal to allow the successful party in a
Board proceeding to intervene as a party in appellate review of that
proceeding. The processes of the Board have been viewed as
mechanisms by which the public interest in labor peace was to be
effectuated, and thus it accrued to the public, as represented by the
Board, to prosecute or defend appeals from the determinations of
that public agency.3 The rights of parties who were successful in
Board hearings, be they parties charging unfair labor practices or
the parties so charged, were viewed as distinctly subordinate to the
public weal4 and were consequently relegated to amicus status in
149 Stat. 449 (1935) (amended by 61 Stat. 136 (1947), and 73 Stat. 525, 541 (1959),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 150-68 (1964)).
2UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 218 (1965).
3 See notes 20-26 infra and accompanying text.
4According to the traditional theory, the National Labor Relations Act exists
for the effectuation of the public interest, and the only private interests recognized
and protected by the act were those coextensive with the "public interest." See, e.g.,
Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25 (1952); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177
(1941); National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940). Thus, private interests
theoretically received protection only incidentally to the promotion of the public
policies of the act because an incompatible private interest asserted by an individual,
if recognized independently, might subvert the express public interest. The issue
therefore is not whether "private interests" in general are recognized within the
statutory scheme, but whether "private interests" which are distinct from or conflict
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appellate proceedings.5
The "public rights doctrine" has been steadily eroded by the no-
tion that the NLRA does in fact extend some recognition and protec-
tion to independent private interests. A continuing source of confu-
sion, however, has been the inability of the courts to delineate clearly
the procedural or remedial safeguards for those interests. In the re-
cent decision of UAW v. Scofield,6 the Supreme Court resolved one
aspect of the controversy by finding that parties who are wholly
successful in unfair labor practice proceedings before the NLRB
should have the procedural right to intervene in courts of appeals
review proceedings. The reasoning employed by the Court may
also presage expanded procedural and reniedial protection in other
contexts for the parochial interests of the private parties to a labor
dispute.
The Scofield decision subsumed two consolidated cases arising
from prior Labor Board proceedings.7 In Scofield v. NLRB,8 the
Board dismissed an unfair labor practice complaint previously filed
on behalf of four employees protesting certain actions of Local 238
of the UAW.9 The employees sought review in the Seventh
Circuit and the union, the successful charged party below, filed a
timely motion for intervention. Despite the fact that neither the
employees nor the Board opposed the motion, the court denied
the union's request. 10 In Fafnir Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 11 the Board
with the "public interest" should be accorded such recognition and protection given
their subordinate status.
5See note, 10 infra.
382 U.S. 205 (1965).
7The cases presented "converse sides of a single question-whether parties who are
wholly successful in unfair labor practice proceedings before the National Labor Re-
lations Board have a right to intervene in the Court of Appeals review proceedings."
Id. at 207.
8 50 CCH Lab. Cas. 32595 (7th Cir. 1964), reo'd and remanded sub nom. UAW v.
Scofield, 382 U.S. 205 (1965).
9 UAW (Wisconsin Motor Corp.) 145 N.L.R.B. 1097, motion to intervene denied
sub nom. Scofield v. NLRB, 50 CCH Lab. Cas. 32595 (7th Cir. 1964), rev'd and remanded
sub nom. UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205 (1965).
1o The court merely authorized the Union to file a brief as amicus curiae without
leave to participate in oral argument. 382 U.S. at 207. However, the privileges
granted to an amicus are not adequate substitutes for those accorded an intervening
party in appellate proceedings. Typically, an intervenor, but not an amicus, is per-
mitted "to participate in the designation of the record"-viz., make additions thereto.
See, e.g., 7-. CR. R. 14. The intervenor, as a party, is allowed to participate in oral
argnment-an amicus cannot. See, e.g., D.C. Cm. R. 18 (i). An intervenor, but not an
amicus, is permitted to petition for a rehearing. See, e.g., 7TH CR. R. 25. An intervenor
has the right to appeal and seek reversal of any adverse judgment. See Fishgold v.
Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 828 U.S. 275, 283 (1946); International Union. of
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had found the company guilty of an unfair labor practice and
issued a cease and desist order.'2 The company petitioned the Sec-
ond Circuit for review and the union, the successful charging
party below, moved to intervene. In this case, both the company
and the Board opposed the union's motion and the court denied
intervention. The Supreme Court reversed both denials of inter-
vention, holding that the recognition of such a private right would
be neither inconsistent with nor obstructive of the "public interest"
sought to be effectuated by the National Labor Relations Act.' 3 The
Court noted that it would be unfair to deny intervention to the
beneficiary of a Board order merely because section 10 of the act 4
did not expressly allow such a procedure. 15
Section 10 provides a comprehensive grant of remedial powers
to the NLRB, 6 which includes exclusive primary jurisdiction over
unfair labor practice complaints and the power to initiate, on its
own motion, enforcement proceedings in the circuit courts.' 7 On the
other hand, section 10 accords rather cursory attention to the rights
of the private participants in the dispute-settling process. For ex-
Mine Workers v. Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co., 325 U.S. 335, 338-39 (1945);
United States v. California Cooperative Canners, 279 U.S. 553, 559 (1929). An amicus,
on the other hand, has no right to appeal. See Ex parte Leaf Tobacco Bd. of Trade,
222 U.S. 578 (1911); Ex parte Cutting, 94 U.S. 14 (1876). See generally 4 MooRE, FED-
ERAL PRACCE 24.15, at 104 (2d ed. 1963).
11339 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1964), rev'd sub nom. UAW v. Scofield, 882 U.S. 205
(1965).
12 146 N.L.R.B. 1582 (1964), motion to intervene denied, 339 F.2d 801 (2d Cir.
1964), rev'd sub nom. UAW v. Scofield, 382 US 205 (1965).
13 382 U.S. at 212-16.
14 National Labor Relations Act § 10 (f), 49 Stat. 455 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 160() (1964).
'1 382 U.S. at 208-10, 213.
IL The unparalleled comprehensiveness of the remedial powers conferred upon the
National Labor Relations Board by § 10 of the Wagner Act was the direct result of the
relative impotence of the preceding National Labor Board. The NLB's inability to
enforce its own orders or to obtain prompt judicial enforcement thereof enabled em-
ployers to flout the act with relative impunity. Note, 53 HAsv. L. Rnv. 472, 473 (1940).
Moreover, the retention of overlapping jurisdiction by other administrative agencies
emasculated the NLB's primary function of guaranteeing industrial harmony through
the development of a unified system of labor relations law. See Brief for Petitioner
(Fafnir Bearing Co.), p. 20, UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205 (1965); Comment, 32 U.
Ci. L. REv. 786, 795 (1965); Note, 53 HI- v. L. RFv. 801 (1939). See generally Garner
v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953); S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-6,
15 (1935); H.R. REP. No. 972, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-6, 15 (1935); LEasLsTIVE HISrORY
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 4, 534, 2295, 2650 (1935); Rothman, The
National Labor Relations Board and Administrative Law, 29 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 301-04
(1960); Note, 51 HALv. L. Rav. 722, 733 (1938).
17 National Labor Relations Act § 10 (a), (e), 49 Stat. 453, 454 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 160 (a), (e) (1964).
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ample, while an "aggrieved party" can seek judicial review of a
Board order, 8 the section is silent as to whether a similar right to
participate as a party to a review is afforded a beneficiary of that
order.'9
An early interpretation of section 10 by the Supreme Court
accentuated the primacy of the public interest over private rights
and remedies when, in the 1940 case of Amalgamated Util. Workers
v. Consolidated Edison Co., 20 the Court propounded the "public
rights doctrine." In Amalgamated, the Court denied a union pe-
tition to have the employer adjudged in contempt of a lower court
decree enforcing a Board cease and desist order, reasoning that the
Wagner Act was intended to protect the public interest and not
to create independent private remedial rights. "What Congress said
at the outset [of section 10], that the power of the Board to prevent
any unfair practice . . . is exclusive, is . . . fully carried out at
every stage of the proceeding." 2' Consequently, the courts were
deemed to have "no jurisdiction to . . . entertain a petition for
violation of . . . [their decrees] of enforcement save as the Board
presents [them]." 22 Thus, the pristine "public rights doctrine" was
framed so as to deny independent remedial rights to the private
participant in a labor dispute and, to compound the isolation of the
private party, section 10 was construed to deny him all procedural
rights except those unambiguously accorded him as a charged or "ag-
gnieved" party.23
1 8 
"Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in
whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in any circuit
court of appeals of the United States .... National Labor Relations Act § 10 (), 49
Stat. 455 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (f) (1964).
29 See Brief for Petitioner (Scofield), pp. 13-15, UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205
(1965); Comment, 32 U. CH. L. REv. 786 (1965).
20 309 U.S. 261 (1940).
21 Id. at 266.
22 Id. at 270.
2' A "remedial right" is a legally guaranteed remedy or redress for the deprivation
or breach of interests and duties recognized by substantive law. On the other hand,
"procedural rights" are prescribed methods for protecting interests or enforcing
remedial rights. Cf. Barker v. St. Louis County, 340 Mo. 986, 1001-03, 104 S.W.2d
371, 377-79 (1937). Section 10 (b) of the NLRA provides that the charged party shall
be given notice of the charges against him, the place and time of the hearing and that
"the person so complained of shall have the right to file an answer to the original
or amended complaint and to appear in person or otherwise and give testimony at the
place and time fixed in the complaint." 49 Stat. 453 (1953), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (b) (1964).
Similarly, § 10(f) provides that "any person aggrieved by a final order of the
Board granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review
of such order in any circuit court of appeals in the United States .... " 49 Stat.
455 (1953), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1964).
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Despite weighty criticism, 24 this doctrine has permeated judicial
determinations of private remedial and procedural rights under the
NLRA for more than two decades. 25 The Amalgamated rule has
often been applied to preclude intervention at the appellate level
by the beneficiary of a Board order. Since such a beneficiary could
not qualify as an "aggrieved party" under section 10, a court of
appeals was viewed as lacking the power under the NLRA to grant
intervention rights.20
The rigidity of the "public rights doctrine," notwithstanding its
pervasive influence, was somewhat eroded by later decisions. In
International Union of Mine Workers v. Eagle-Picher Mining &
Smelting Co.,2 7 for example, the Supreme Court held that unions
which had been permitted to intervene as parties in the lower court
had standing to petition for certiorari to seek review of an adverse
decision from which the Board did not prosecute an appeal. 28 Thus,
while it reaffirmed Amalgamated's holding that a beneficiary of a
NLRB order could not institute enforcement proceedings, the Court
implied that the NLRA did not absolutely prohibit intervention
and that the courts could, in their discretion, permit the successful
charged or charging party at the Board level to intervene on appeal.
This erosion of the doctrine by the judiciary also received added
impetus from the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947.29 Congress
24 See, e.g., Jaffe, The Public Right Dogma in Labor Board Cases, 59 HARv. L. RFv.
720 (1946). See also Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953). See generally
Hall, The Taft-Hartley Act v. State Regulation, 1 J. PUB. L. 97 (1952); Rose, The
Labor Management Relations Act and the State's Power to Grant Relief, 39 VA. L.
REv. 765 (1953).
"See Comment, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 786, 794 (1965).
For example, in one of the earliest intervention cases, Stewart Die Casting Corp.
v. NLRB, 132 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1942), the court relied on Amalgamated's "public
rights doctrine" to deny an employee's motion to intervene in order to contest the
entering of a compliance stipulation between the Board and the company for less
than the full amount of back pay due. The court said that while it seemed "un-
reasonable and illogical" to deny a hearing to the employees who are entitled to the
money for their unlawful discharge, under § 10 a private party could invoke the
jurisdiction of the court of appeals only if he brought his case within § 10 (f) as an
"aggrieved party." Id. at 804. See note 18 supra. Since the employees had been the
beneficiaries of the Board's order and were therefore not "aggrieved," their motion
to intervene was "beyond the power of this court to grant." Stewart Die Casting
Corp. v. NLRB, supra at 804.
:7 325 U.S. 335 (1945).
8Id. at 338-39.
2
-"Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-44, 151-68, 171-87 (1964).
In Taft-Hartley, Congress may have withdrawn the keystone of the Amalgamated
decision by deleting the phrase "this power shall be exclusive . . ." from § 10 (a).
See note 21 supra and accompanying text. In Amalgamated, "the Court placed great
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demonstrated therein that the recognition of independent private
interests and the accordance of private remedial rights was not incon-
sistent with the policies of the NLRA. For example, labor and
management were accorded the right to bring suit in the district
courts to enforce collective bargaining agreements30 and to recover
damages caused by violations of these agreements.3 1
As a result of the relaxation of the "public rights doctrine"
evinced by Eagle-Picher and the Taft-Hartley amendments, the
courts of appeals began to adopt a more liberal posture towards
intervention. A majority of the courts abandoned the view that
section 10 was absolute in its implicit denial of circuit court power
to permit intervention. 2 Rather, intervention was generally allowed
if certain conditions were met: (1) the participation of the potential
intervenor should promote the public interest by providing a more
complete exposition of the competing factors at issue;83 and (2) both
weight upon the language and legislative history behind § 10 (a) ... as it read at that
time . . . . The ... [this power shall be exclusive] portion of § 10 (a) was deleted
in the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act in 1947, when Congress added the
union unfair labor practice provisions and enacted § 301 (a). While it is true
that the Labor Board does not confer a private administrative remedy, it is equally
true that, since 1947, it serves substantially as an organ for adjudicating private
disputes." 382 U.S. at 221 n.18. However, the deletion was obviously necessary to
maintain the internal consistency of the act in light of the provisions for private
suits in the district court, note 31 infra, and it may have been intended to serve no
other purpose. See LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Aer
499, 556 (1947). No mention was made in the committee hearings as to liberalizing the
role of the private disputant in pre-existing procedure.
30 "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties ...." Labor Management Relations
Act § 301 (a), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
This section has been interpreted not only to allow suits between employers and
unions, but also to permit an individual employee to sue his employer to enforce the
collective bargaining contract. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964);
Smith v. Evening News, 371 U.S. 195 (1962). Thus, judicial construction of § 501 (a)
further illustrates the evolving recognition and protection of private interests within
the regulatory scheme of the NLRA.
31 "Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason or [sic] any
violation of subsection (a) may sue therefor in any district court ...and shall re-
cover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit." Labor Management
Relations Act § 303 (b), 61 Stat. 159 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (b) (1964).
3 2 See, e.g., Carrier Corp. v. NLRB, 311 F.2d 135 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds,
376 U.S. 492 (1962); Great Western Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 591 (9th
Cir. 1962); Selby-Battersby & Co. v. NLRB, 259 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1958); American
Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 45 (7th Cir. 1951). Contra, NLRB v.
Santa Clara Lemon Ass'n, 274 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1960); Haleston Drug Stores, Inc. v.
NLRB, 190 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1950).
-3"In such proceedings [review of a Board order], private parties have no rightful
place except as the court may desire to avail itself of helpful suggestions." Aluminum
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the Board and the "aggrieved" party acquiesced in the motion.34
Yet the failure of the Supreme Court to re-evaluate the "public rights
doctrine" during this period forced the lower courts to pay it con-
tinued lip service and produced continued conflict among the
circuits.85
In Scofield, the Supreme Court perfected the evolution of the
standing of the successful party in a Board proceeding to intervene
in appellate review or enforcement proceedings by guaranteeing
him a right to intervene. 36 Implicit in this decision was a recog-
nition that independent, albeit subordinate, private interests are
to be recognized under the NLRA.87 Theoretically, the recognition
of strong private interests would be accomplished by according
them substantive protection. By guaranteeing intervention rights,
however, Scofield accorded private interests only a procedural right
and did not purport to extend a protective mantle to remedies
Ore Co. v. NLRB, 131 F.2d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 1942). See Amalgamated Meat Cutters
v. NLRB, 267 F.2d 169, 170 (Ist Cir. 1959); NLRB v. Retail Clerk Int'l Ass'n, 243
F.2d 777, 783 (9th Cir. 1956).
3' Mutual agreement upon intervention by both the Board and the "aggrieved"
party has often been the determinative factor. In these cases, intervention was
generally granted without judicial comment in the text of the opinions. See, e.g.,
West Texas Util. Co. v. NLRB, 184 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1950); cases cited note 33 supra.
However, in a few cases intervention was denied even though the other parties had not
challenged the motion. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. NLRB, supra note 33,
at 170.
-5 Emblematic of the conflict between the Supreme Court's position in Amalgamated,
see text accompanying notes 21-23 supra, and the recurring desire of lower courts to
accord a procedural or remedial protection to a legitimate private interest was the
resort to the "private Attorneys General" concept. This doctrine had its roots
in the Second Circuit, where Judge Frank rationalized the accordance of such
a right by asserting that "nothing constitutionally . . . [prohibits] Congress from
empowering any person, official or not, to institute a proceeding involving
such a controversy, even if the sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest.
Such persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals [sic]." As-
sociated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943). The courts utilized
this concept to justify permitting a private party to institute a proceeding, under other
administrative acts, even where Congress had not expressly authorized such a pro-
cedure. See, e.g., Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14-15 (1942); FCC v.
Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940); W. R. Grace & Co. v. CAB, 154
F.2d 271, 286 n.2 (2d Cir. 1946).
0 382 U.S. at 208.
'7 Under the "public rights doctrine," the NLRA is viewed as exclusively designed
to promote and protect the "public" interest. The only protections accorded
'"private" interests under the act are those expressly conferred in the statute or those
which incidentally accrue to a private interest in the course of furthering the "public"
interest. See notes 4, 21-23 supra and accompanying text. Thus, before a court can
reach the question of whether an asserted "private interest" should receive procedural
or remedial protection, it must first decide whether the NLRA permits the recognition
of such a parochial interest.
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which might ameliorate a substantive deficiency in Board deter-
minations. Thus, Scofield merely ensures that a private party will
have an opportunity to apprise the court of his interest.38  To this
extent, the decision represents a compromise between the need to
accord some protection to acknowledged private interests and the
more basic tenet of the "public rights doctrine" that the primacy of
the public interest precludes recognition of all conflicting private
remedial rights.3 9
38 The primary source of confusion over the permissible role of the private disputant
under the NLRA has been the Court's repeated failure to clearly differentiate between
an "interest" and a "right." The legislative history of the Wagner Act, see, e.g.,
LEGISLATIVE HIs-roRy OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr (1935), and the prin-
cipal cases interpreting the act, see, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S.
177, 194 (1941); Amalgamated Util. Workers; NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.,
306 U.S. 240, 258 (1939), all emphasize that the NLRA was not designed to protect
private rights. Similarly, when the later cases began to soften the rigidity of that
concept the courts used the terms "rights" and "interest" indiscriminately. However,
these courts were necessarily referring to two distinct concepts. While it was clear
that under the original NLRA no private remedial rights were created, it was
equally obvious that the existence of private interests was recognized and that private
procedural rights were, in some instances, accorded those interests. Nevertheless, the
courts, including the Supreme Court in Scofield, consistently refused to make these
distinctions clear.
The distinction between a "right" and an "interest" is implied in jurisprudential
writing. See AuSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 410 (3d ed. 1869); HOLLAND, ELEMENTS
OF JURISPRUDENCE 83 (13th ed. 1928); SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 237-38 (10th ed. 1947);
TERRY, SOME LEADING PRINCIPLES OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 97 (1884); Cook, The
Utility of Jurisprudence in the Solution of Legal Problems, in LEcrumRs ON LEGAL
Topics, 1923-24, at 333-58 (1928); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private
Actions, 75 HARv. L. REv. 255 (1961); Terry, Duties, Rights and Wrongs, 10 A.B.A.J.
123 (1924). More recently, Roscoe Pound isolated three categories of interests: "For
the purposes of the science of law we may say that an interest is a claim, a want, a
demand, of a human being. . . which the human being . . . seeks to satisfy and of
which social engineering in civilized society must therefore take account. So defined,
the interests which the legal order secures may be . . . [those) of individual human
beings [individual interests] . .. (those] of the political organization of society [public
interests] or [those] of the whole social group [social interests] .... " Pound, A
Theory of Social Interests, in READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE 241 (Hall ed. 1938). Cf.
BENTHAm, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 144-45, 163 (Hildreth ed. 1876). Thus a party
may have a parochial interest, distinct from the "public interests," yet that interest
does not become a "right" unless, and until, it is accorded remedial or procedural
protection. Cf. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HIv.
L. REV. 255, 256 (1961).
"The court observed that in earlier decisions it had recognized "the existence
of private rights within the statutory scheme." 382 U.S. at 218. See, e.g., Smith v.
Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 27 (1952);
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 38, at 194; NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical
Corp., supra note 38, at 258. See generally Jaffe, The Public Right Dogma in Labor
Board Cases, 59 HARV. L. REv. 720, 728-31 (1946). "These cases have, to be sure,
emphasized the 'public interest' factor. To employ the rhetoric of 'public interest,'
however, is not to imply that the public right excludes recognition of parochial private
interests." 382 U.S. at 218. Later the Scofield Court tendered this statement: "In
short, we think that the statutory pattern of the Labor Act does not dichotomize
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The recognition of subordinate private interests, however, does
not require the accordance of private procedural safeguards,40
since a court might simply make an independent assessment of the
private interest in its decisional process. In granting a procedural
right of intervention in Scofield, therefore, the Court seemingly
employed the balancing process familiar in other contexts. 41 It is
arguable that the procedural right of intervention was extended
to the beneficiaries of Board orders only after a determination that
the importance of the asserted private interests outweighed the fore-
seeable adverse impact which the conferral of the private procedural
right would have on the Board's effectuation of the predominant
public interest.4
'public' as opposed to 'private' interests. Rather, the two interblend in the intricate
statutory scheme." Id. at 220. See Retail Clerks Union v. Food Employers Council, Inc.,
351 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1965).
A similar observation had been made by the Supreme Court in Garner v. Team-
sters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953). "Perhaps the clearest thing to emerge from the
best-considered literature on this subject is that the two terms are not mutually ex-
clusive, that the two classifications overlap .... ." Id. at 500. Similarly, Professor
Jaffe argued that "reflection and examination alike will demonstrate that these
very useful shorthands, 'private' and 'public' right, are not mutually exclusive cate-
gories, a twain bound by the legal proprieties never to meet. In the sense of the end
which legal action has in view or the interests which are to be secured, there is no
clear and shining line between so-called private rights enforced by individual litigants
and so-called public rights enforced by an agency like the National Labor Relations
Board. Jaffe, The Public Right Dogma in Labor Board Cases, 59 HARv. L. REv. 720
(1946). "It is, I think, one of the fundamental insights or premises of democratic theory
that all lines of value lead back to the individual. The public is individuals, sep-
arately and in groups." Id. at 724.
,0 An "interest" might include anything from a mere preference for one outcome or
state of affairs over another to some actual but remote adverse impact on the party
asserting the "interest." In the former, the courts would rarely provide remedial or
procedural protection. An analogous problem arises in regard to questions of standing
to sue. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). See generally 3 DAvis, AD-
MINiSATIVE LAW TREAmsE § 22 (1958); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Pri-
vate Actions, 75 HAv. L. Rxv. 255 (1961). In the latter, while a court might grant such
protection, it would not be compelled to do so. Cf. Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S.
48 (1955); Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron Moulders Union, 254 U.S. 77 (1920); Williams
v. Bankhead, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 563 (1873); Horn v. Lockhart, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.)
570 (1873); Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1854); ICC v. Blue Diamond
Prods. Corp., 192 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1951); White v. Douds, 80 F. Supp. 402 (S.D.N.Y.
1948). In Scofield, the potential adverse impact to the charged party was not remote,
for he stood to incur liability in case of an adverse ruling and remand by the reviewing
court. 382 U.S. at 212. The adverse impact to the charging party, though remote, was
foreseeable because of the probable negative impact of an adverse decision upon his
suit under § 301 (a). Id. at 220; see Brief for Petitioner (Scofield), pp. 17-27.
"1 See Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YAr.E L.J. 1424 (1962).
42 "If, then, individual remedial interests can be protected under the NLRA with-
out infringing upon the public interest, they should definitely be so served. The fact
that victims of unfair labor practices are completely dependent upon the adequacy of
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However, the manner in which this balancing test was applied
in Scofield indicates a solicitude for the protection of private in-
terests which might permeate decisions in other areas where recog-
nition and protection of a private interest are sought.48 For example,
the Board contended that the charging party should have no right
to intervention because he could only become the beneficiary of an
order entered by the Board. Accordingly, he would have no greater
interest in the outcome of the review than any other member of the
public. 44 The Scofield Court emphasized, however, the foreseeable
adverse impact a decision as to the unfair labor practice complaint
might have on the union's potential civil suit under section 301 (a).45
Since the claim in the instant case conceivably involved a breach of
the parties' collective bargaining agreement, the Union could, under
section 301 (a), institute a separate suit for breach of contract in the
district court. While it is true that the rights and duties created by
section 301 are not coextensive with those redressed in unfair labor
practice proceedings, a determination in the latter proceedings
that the employer had not impinged upon the Union's statutory
rights would surely have a precedential impact upon the Union's
contractual claim. 46 However, while this observation was applicable
to the case at bar, the possibility of such potential suits will not
be present in unfair labor practice proceedings such as organizational
disputes where perforce no collective bargaining agreement exists.
In the absence of the aforementioned interest, the charging party
appears to be adequately represented by the Board's defense of its
own order.
Board proceedings for relief argues strongly in favor of affording full procedural
protections whenever possible." Comment, 32 U. Css. L. Rav. 786, 797 (1965).
"3 However, the recent case of Reynolds v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 250 F. Supp.
722 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), may indicate that the courts will restrict the Scofield decision
and its reasoning to the narrow holding of that case. In Reynolds, the union, as
charging party, sought to intervene in a proceeding brought by the NLRB in the
district court for a temporary injunction pursuant to § 10 (j). Both the Board and thb
charged party opposed the intervention, and the court denied the motion. The
court expressly distinguished Scofleld: "The case of . .. [Automobile Workers] ... v.
Scofield... is not in point. The possibility of multiplicity of appeals was present there.
The Court was reviewing a final order pursuant to section 160 (f). The determination
by the Court of Appeals could affect a charging party, the applicant for intervention,
who at some later stage could appeal to the courts if the order was reversed." Id.
at 723.
"382 U.S. at 218. See Brief for NLRB, pp. 25-34. As to the charged party, the
Board itself had urged the recognition and protection of his undeniable interest. He
stood to incur liability for an unfair labor practice in the case of an adverse ruling
and remand by the reviewing court. 382 U.S. at 217-18; see Brief for NLRB, pp. 21-25.
5 382 U.S. at 220.
"6 Ibid.
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Solicitude for the asserted private interest was also indicated by
the Court's cursory assessment of the foreseeable adverse impact
such a private right would have on the public interest involved.47
For example, the Court noted that intervention would have the
desirable effect of preventing wasteful "duplication of proceed-
ings."4s It is submitted, however, that such economies are largely
illusory and appear to have been proferred only to add makeweight
to support the Court's solicitude for protection of the private in-
terests at issue.49 While an appellate court's reversal of an NT2RB
decision to dismiss a complaint would determine the existence of a
17 The Court did not discern any inhibiting effects on the public interest resulting
from a bestowal of intervention rights on the private disputant. The examination
of the potential counterfactors to the acknowledged strength of the private interest was
primarily devoted to cataloging the uncontroverted benefits that would ensue from
permitting the charged party to intervene. In contrast, the Court accorded rather
cursory attention to the Board's argument that, as to the charging party, such a right
would severely impede the effective administration of the act, 382 U.S. at 221-22, for
such a right would enable a private participant to "substitute his discretion for
that of the Board in a range of crucial strategic decisions with respect to the ad-
ministration of the NLRA. ... Brief for NLRB, p. 30.
" The Court asserted that the avoidance of "unnecessary duplication of pro-
ceedings" was consistent with the policies of the NLRA. "'The aim of the Act is to
attain simplicity and directness both in the administrative procedure and on judicial
review. . .. The purpose of the judicial review is consonant with that of the ad-
ministrative proceeding itself,-to secure a just result with a minimum of technical
requirements .... '" 382 U.S. at 211-12, quoting Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
364, 369, 373 (1939). Thus the avoidance of "duplication" was designed not merely
to protect adjudicative efficiency but was dictated by, and formulated to promote, the
public policies of the act.
49Similarly, the Court rather curtly rejected the Board's contention that the
accordance of intervention rights to a private disputant, and the concomitant right
to independently petition for certiorari, would seriously interfere with the develop-
ment of a unified system of labor relations law through administrative expertise. See
Brief for NLRB, pp. 28-29. In response, the Court observed that the Board was free to
advise the denial of certiorari and, moreover, that Congress had entrusted the Court,
not the NLRB, with "discretionary jurisdiction to review cases decided by the Court
of Appeals." 382 U.S. at 221-22. Arguably, however, since the Board is bound by the
Supreme Court's determinations as to the legal issue involved, the NLRB's quasi-
legislative power is somewhat specious if the Board is unable to control the cases
reviewed by the Court and is thus unable to ensure that the issues will be presented
in the best possible factual context. Yet, in reality, the right of an intervenor to
petition for certiorari would not significantly undermine the Board's control. The
NLRB's opposition to such a petition would, in all probability, guarantee its rejection
in most cases. See id. at 221. Therefore, by implication, the Board's opposition would
be disregarded only when it was contraposed to a strong private interest. Since
Scofield posited that the NLRA was designed to protect both public and private in-
terests, such infrequent results would be consistent with and not opposed to the
policies of the act. The Court has, consequently, placed the burden upon the Board
to demonstrate the particular circumstances which make a specific case an inap-
propriate vehicle for the consideration of the legal issue involved therein. By so allo-
cating the burden of proof, the Court again illustrated the deference accorded private
interests. See also notes 43, 47 supra and accompanying text.
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violation of the NLRA, it remains the Board's function to construct
the cease and desist order. In so doing, the Board might require the
filing of additional arguments and/or a hearing, thereby prolonging
the proceedings, and, conceivably, partially relitigating the issues.
Furthermore, after a cease and desist order is issued, the charged
party would be free to attack the specific provisions of that order.
Such an attack would inevitably involve a reargument of the nature
and extent, although not the existence, of the party's violation as
it is "remedied" by the order. Thus despite the allowance of the
right to intervene and appeal in the initial proceeding, the issues
could still be twice litigated. 0 As to the charging party, the Board
pointed out in its brief that it was, at best, speculative that section
10 (f) could be interpreted to permit an appeal from a dismissal of his
complaint by the Board pursuant to an appellate court's reversal of a
previously issued cease and desist order.5' "So clear is this that we
[the Board] know of no case in which a charging party has ever
attempted to appeal from a Board order dismissing a complaint pur-
suant to the reviewing court's mandate."52 Therefore, unless the
Supreme Court intends to permit such an appeal and thereby intro-
50 This is not to say that the party could relitigate the question of his violation
of the act; the principles of res judicata would foreclose that possibility. See 882
U.S. at 213. However, the Board's final order would specify the precise conduct of the
party which was prohibited and/or require a specific amount of back pay to be given
to workers unlawfully discharged. In challenging such an order, the party would be
free to argue that the order was too broad in relation to the extent or nature of his
violation, which would depend upon the extent of the findings by the appellate court
in the original review proceeding. Once this issue is raised, the facts of the violation
once again come into dispute.
51 lmplicit in the Board's argument is its dependence on the underlying theory
of the "private Attorneys General" concept. See note 35 supra. The NLRB observed
that permitting the charging party to appeal an order dismissing his complaint is in-
tended only to serve the public interest by ensuring that the Board's interpretation
of the statute is consistent with the intent of Congress. The parochial interests
of the charging party thus do not constitute the imprimatur for private appeal. Con-
sequently, since the public interest is served by the first appeal, a second appeal on the
same issue following a dismissal pursuant to a reviewing court's decision would be
inappropriate. See Brief for NLRB, pp. 32-33. Yet the "private Attorneys General"
doctrine was developed at a time when prevailing labor theory held that private
interests were not recognized under the NLRA and the doctrine was designed
to circumvent the rigidity of that theory. See note 35 supra. Accordingly, its appli-
cation, particularly as a restrictive device, to post-Scofield determinations would seem
to be inconsistent with recognition accorded private interests by that decision. However,
since a second appeal would not appear to be necessary to adequately protect the
private disputant, if he has had an adjudication on the merits in his first review, the
refusal to apply the public rights doctrine would not necessarily lead to a recognition
of such a right to a second appeal.
5 Brief for NLRB, pp. 32-33.
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duce yet another avenue for duplication, the "avoidance-of-dupli-
cation" postulate is immaterial as to the charging party.
The Court has thus utilized a balancing approach to accord
an independent procedural right to intervene. Moreover, the de-
cision may also presage the utilization of this approach in similar
contexts where the protection of a private interest is sought under
the NLRA.53 While the Court explicitly restricted its holding to
the narrow issue of the right to intervene in appellate proceedings,54
its emphasis upon the private interest asserted would likewise seem
to compel the increased recognition of additional procedural rights
for private parties in administrative proceedings before the NLRB.55
The extension of Scofield to this area would similarly entail only the
conferral of a procedural right and would therefore necessitate no
erosion of the "public rights doctrine" in regard to administrative
treatment of private remedial rights. The balancing process, how-
ever, would require greater recognition of the public interest in this
situation since the need for exclusive control by the NLRB is much
"Avoidance or cursory examination of the factors indicating the existence of a
public interest which militates against intervention in Scofield may be explainable as
a product of previous determination by the court that these factors were not sufficiently
significant to warrant detailed consideration. On the other hand, the solicitude given
the private interest asserted may indicate a willingness to establish a presumption
in favor of recognizing and protecting the private interest, which the Board can
rebut only by assuming the burden of showing that recognition of the private interest
will effectively subvert the public interest. Unlike the allocation of burdens under the
balancing approach, such a burden would mean that if the presumption is recog-
nized, the private litigant need only establish the existence and cogency of the
private interest. The Board must then establish not only that a specific public
interest exists but also that it will clearly be subverted if the private right is recog-
nized. The Court seemingly adopts this approach in at least one limited phase of
the intervention proceedings. In answering the Board's assertion that intervention
undermines NLRB discretion in petitioning for certiorari only where public interest
dictates, the court observed that the Board could advise the court of the inappro-
priateness of the case for review in opposing the petition. See note 49 supra.
51 The Court's holding is couched in very precise and narrow language. 382 U.S. at
208. The Court emphasized that in an appellate proceeding the Board no longer has
exclusive, or even primary, control over the effectuation of the "public interest." Id.
at 221. Thus there is greater flexibility for the protection of private interests without
impinging upon the Board's function of initially developing a foundation of expert
labor-management law. Moreover, the Court expressly distinguished the issue of the
rights of private disputants at the administrative level from the question of what
rights are available to said disputants at the appellate level. Id. at 219-20 n.15. See
note 56 infra.
rr Recently, both the courts and commentators have called for greater procedural
rights for the private party before the NLRB. See generally Comment, The Charging
Party Before the NLRB: A Private Right in the Public Interest, 32 U. CHi. L. Rv.
786 (1965). Scofield gave added impetus to this plea by expressly recognizing that the
private party may have "vital 'private rights' in the Board proceeding." 382 U.S. at
220.
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stronger at the administrative than at the appellate level.5 0 Re-
cently, the Third Circuit in Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB57 ex-
tended the Scofield rationale5s by holding that while the charging
party had no right to have a complaint issued, he did have a right
to a hearing before the Board entered into a settlement which ef-
fectuated a withdrawal of an issued complaint.59 The result seems
consistent with the balancing test inferred from the Scofield opinion
in that the factual context discloses no adverse effect upon the
public interest in expeditious administrative resolution of labor
disputes which would be subverted by affording the complainant a
pre-settlement hearing. It has been empirically shown that the con-
ferral of such a right after the issuance of the complaint would
neither seriously undermine the Board's control over its docket nor
its manpower and budgetary considerations."
r' "Of course, the considerations involved in determining whether the charging
party has certain rights before the Board are not dispositive on the question of
appellate intervention. In the first place, the need for centralized control over the
agency hearings and the standards under which they operate is much greater at the
administrative than the appellate level, where perforce an adequate record has been
made for adjudication. Also . . . 97% of the unfair labor practice charges are resolved
before the circuit court has entered a decree .... This winnowing process diminishes
once a case is lodged in the circuit court and falls within our supervisory power over
the federal courts. Then, too, manpower and budgetary considerations are of great
concern at the administrative level. These factors are not nearly as great when a
labor dispute reaches the appellate courts since the Board will invariably appear
to defend its order." 382 U.S. at 219-20 n.15.
574 CCH LAB. L. REP. (53 CCH Lab. Cas.) 11060 (3d Cir. Feb. 3, 1966).
" The Third Circuit proceeded from the proposition that "the Board and its
Agents act in the public interest. However, not exclusively so, or in utter disregard
of private interests." 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. (53 CCH Lab. Cas.) 11060, at 16298. After
the issuance of a complaint, the court asserted that the charging party has a right to a
hearing before his complaint is, in effect, dismissed. Id. at 16299. The court noted the
Board's legitimate interest in controlling its docket and manpower, but implied that the
"arbitrariness" that would result from a summary dismissal outweighed any slight
adverse impact upon the Board's efficiency. Id. at 16298-99. On the other hand, the
court dearly indicated that the balance favored exclusive Board control over the
original issuance of the complaint. Id. at 16299. Thus the court appears to have
utilized the balancing test of Scofield to determine the procedural rights to be ac-
corded a private interest at the administrative level.
" Id. at 16298-99.
0 The vast bulk of unfair labor practice cases are disposed of at the regional
office level and most of them are handled without formal proceedings. For example,
in 1958, 6,654, or 91.3% of the 7,289 cases dosed were disposed of without the
issuance of a formal complaint. Short of the issuance of a complaint, a charge may
be disposed of by (1) withdrawal (50% of the cases in 1958); (2) dismissal (30% of
the cases in 1958); or (3) adjustment (10% of the cases in 1958). Moreover, another
249, or 3.4% of the cases were settled without a hearing before a trial examiner.
23 NLRB ANN. REP. 150 (1959). See Silverburg, Informal Procedures of the National
Relations Board, 6 SYRACUsE L. REv. 72 (1954); Weyand & Zarky, Informal Procedures
Before the National Labor Relations Board, Prac. Law. Jan. 1955, p. 31.
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Under the Scofield decision, a private party might also be
granted the right to independently seek enforcement of the Board's
orders.61 The act's policy of centralizing decision-making so as to
produce a body of labor-management law developed through the
expertise of an administrative agency would not be subverted by
such a procedure. The Board's primary jurisdiction over unfair
labor practice proceedings, and thus its fundamental responsibility
for the development of labor relations law, would be unaffected, for
private enforcement rights would not give the private party the
opportunity to participate in and interfere with the Board's de-
cisional process. Moreover, in any judicial review or enforcement
proceeding, no matter by whom it is instituted, the court and not
the NLRB, assumes the responsibility for effectuating the policies
of the NLRA.6 2 Further, a private right to effectuate enforcement
independently would have the salutary effect of providing an addi-
tional sanction to the act's prohibitions and would facilitate the
prompt resolution and redress of unfair labor practices.63
"
1While this result would be contrary to the holding in Amalgamated Util.
Workers, see text accompanying notes 20-22 supra, it has been espoused by Professor
Jaffe in an article cited in the Scofield opinion, 382 U.S. at 218 n.12. "[T]he reasons
* . . which may account for the Board's exclusive power to initiate proceedings do not
justify to the same degree a sole power to enforce its orders, at least after the
Board has seen fit to secure a judicial order of enforcement." Jaffe, The Public Right
Dogma in Labor Board Cases, 59 HARV. L REv. 720, 727-28 (1946). Jaffe also argued
that "once a body of doctrine has been developed, jurisdiction [at the Board level]
could conceivably, if there were any strong reason for it, be placed on a non-dis-
cretionary basis, as with the ICC and the workmen's compensation boards." Id. at 728.
"Undeniably however, the recognition of a private right to initiate enforcement
proceedings would narrow the NLRB's discretion in deciding when and how to enforce
its orders. A decision by the Board not to seek enforcement is generally based upon
a "weighing of the likelihood of a repetition of the illegal conduct against the time
and expense of litigating . . . and the prospects of losing .... ." Brief for NLRB,
p. 28. Yet, conceivably, neither of the aforesaid factors would invariably counter-
balance the charging party's interest in enjoining or redressing the unfair labor practice
involved. Moreover, a decision not to enforce based upon either of the above factors is,
arguably, inconsistent with the "public interest." If, in fact, the courts would de-
termine that a particular order was unjustified under the provisions of the NLRA,
compliance therewith by the charged party, regardless of how achieved, would be
contrary to the "public interest." See note 64 infra. On the other hand, if the order
was in fact valid and thus conducive to the "public interest," the act's purposes would
seem to be furthered irrespective of which party prosecuted and bore the expense
for the order's enforcement.
G3Where regulated conduct has been expressly proscribed by Congress, the
courts as a general rule have readily inferred or recognized the existence of a private
remedy to aid in the public enforcement of the statute. See, e.g., United Constr.
Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 663-65 (1954); Tunstall v. Bhd.
of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S.
192 (1944); Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940); Wills v. Trans
World Airlines, 200 F. Supp. 360, 363-65 (S.D. Cal. 1961); Aerovias Interamericanas
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While Scofield's approach of balancing to determine whether
a private procedural right should be granted may thus have appli-
cation in procedural contexts other than intervention in a circuit
court, the decision may indicate an even more basic reformulation of
the "public rights doctrine" The Court acknowledged the primacy
of public over private rights under the NLRA, but simultaneously
observed that the existence of a public interest does not preclude
protection of independent, although subordinate, private interests.64
Arguably, increased recognition can be accorded to an asserted
private interest in all cases where the Board is unable to show that
protection of that interest will seriously impinge upon the public
interest involved.65 Such deference for private interests would seem
to follow from the Scofield decision since increased procedural
protection for the interests of the private disputant is a rather
hollow right if the mere incantation of the "public interest"
by the NLRB would continue to be sufficient to foreclose substantive
redress of those interests.6 If the ambit of Scofield in fact proves to
de Panama, S.A. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 197 F. Supp. 230, 250 (S.D. Fla. 1961),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Board of County Comm'rs v. Aerolineas Peruamasa,
S.A., 307 F.2d 802 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 961 (1962); cf. Wheeldin v. Wheeler,
373 U.S. 647, 664-66 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. Weiss,
113 So. 2d 884, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 116 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 1959); Northridgc
Cooperative Section No. I v. 32nd Ave. Constr. Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 514, 530, 533-34, 141
N.E.2d 802, 810, 812 (1957). Specifically, "a private action may especially be favored
where, as the Supreme Court suggested in [Hewitt-Robins Inc. v. Eastern Freight-
Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84, 88 (1962)] .. . it may have a 'healthy deterrent effect' upon
practices outlawed by the statute." O'Neil, Public Regulation and Private Rights of
Action, 52 CAuF. L. REv. 231, 262 (1964). At the same time, however, "the broader
and more detailed ... [the act], the more reluctant the courts are to take interstitial
action in the regulated sector." Id. at 264. Exclusive public enforcement powers are
especially likely to be found where the statutory purpose appears to be a "public"
rather than a "private" one. See id. at 266. Thus the public rights doctrine not only
operates to force a narrow construction of the statutory enforcement provision, but
serves to foreclose the courts from recognizing or preserving private rights of action.
04382 U.S. at 220. The Court said that "in short, we think that the statutory pat-
tern of the Labor Act does not dichotomize 'public' as opposed to 'private' interests.
Rather, the two interblend in the intricate statutory scheme." Ibid.
11In light of the profound changes in labor-management relations which have
occurred since Congress in 1935 expressly disclaimed any intent to create private
rights under the NLRA, see note 38 supra, such antiquated expressions should not
impede an ad hoc determination of the rights to be accorded a subsequently acknowl-
edged private interest. The substance of the regulatory scheme would not thereby
be subverted, for private procedural or remedial rights would be denied where they
would seriously impinge upon the effectuation of the public policies embodied in
the NLRA. See note 42 supra and accompanying text. However, the burden would
be upon the NLRB to demonstrate such a conflict between the "public interest" and
the potential private right. See also note 49 supra.
"Increased procedural protection for the private disputants can be rationalized as
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be this pervasive, an assertion of a private remedial right could not
be summarily dismissed on the grounds that the NLRA exists solely
to effectuate the public interest. For example, the NLRB has per-
sistently refused to recognize the validity of union "no-raiding
agreements" on the grounds that such agreements conflict with the
"public" interest in preserving the employees' freedom of choice of
representatives and that to recognize such agreements would permit
private contracts to limit the policies of the act.67 While an ex-
tension of the Scofield rationale to this area would not ensure com-
plete recognition and protection of such private agreements, it
would curtail the Board's general practice of summarily dismissing
complaints or defenses based upon the provisions of a "no-raiding
agreement." Rather, the General Counsel would be required to
demonstrate how, in a particular case, the enforcement of a specific
agreement would seriously circumscribe the employees' rights in
light of the salutary effect such intra-union compacts have on in-
dustrial harmony.
Scofield may represent the belated maturing of American labor
law. It cannot be gainsaid that, initially, a workable legal framework
within which to promote labor-management harmony was develop-
able only by according primacy to the "public" rather than to
"private" interests. Today, however, that framework has been
welded, and experience thereunder has evolved rules which have
substantially stabilized labor-management relations and have created
justifiable private expectations. Consequently, the NLRB has
become essentially an "organ for the adjudication of private dis-
consistent with and promotive of the "public interest" by insuring a full disclosure
of the competing factors at every adjudicatory level. Similarly, such protection at
least assures the private party that his arguments will be heard. However, it does
not guarantee that those arguments will be listened to by either the Board or the
courts. Nor does the accordance of procedural protection alone provide any assurance
to the private party that he will ever receive substantive redress for his complaint.
67 "[I]n accordance with established policy, the Board has held that a 'no-raiding'
agreement between the petitioner [raiding union] and the intervenor [raided union]
in a case is not grounds for dismissal." 21 NLRB ANN. RE'. 52 (1956). The reasons
for this position were: "'A no-raiding agreement operates to limit the right guaranteed
employees under the Act to full freedom in their choice of [a] bargaining representa-
tive.... Section 10 (a) .. .provides that the Board's regulation under the Act shall
not be limited-by the effect of private agreements.'" Aaron, Interunion Representa-
tion Disputes and the NLRB, 36 TExAs L. Rv. 846, 858 (1958) (quoting the Board's
brief filed in Personal Prods. Corp., 122 N.L.R.B. 563 (1958)). See Cadmium Div. of
Great Lakes Indus., 124 N.L.R.B. 353 (1959). Compare Steck Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 12
(1958), with International Gloveworkers' Union v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 44
L.R.R.M. 2775 (N.D. Ill. 1959). See also Cox, Some Current Problems in Labor Law:
An Appraisal, 35 L.R.R.M. 48, 57 (1955).
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putes." 6s Despite this maturing process, however, private interests
rarely receive independent consideration under the NLRA, and
because of the preemption doctrine they are not protected else-
where.69 The consideration given the private interest asserted
in Scofield could thus provide the impetus for according the private
litigant a larger role in the development of national labor policy.
08 282 U.S. at 221 n.18. "While it is true that the Labor Board does not confer a
private administrative remedy, it is equally true that, since 1947, it serves sub-
stantially as an organ for adjudicating private disputes." Ibid.
09 Through the interaction of the doctrine of preemption, which removes state
jurisdiction over most unfair labor practices, and the rule of primary jurisdiction,
which forecloses the federal courts from this area, "victims of unfair labor practices
are completely dependent upon the adequacy of Board proceedings for relief ... .
Comment, 32 U. Cm. L. Rav. 786, 797 (1965). The Supreme Court reemphasized this
virtual exclusiveness of the federal administrative remedies in San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). The Court asserted that "when an
activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as
the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor
Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be
averted . . . Even the States' salutary effort to redress private wrongs or grant
compensation for past harm cannot be exerted to regulate activities that are po-
tentially subject to the exclusive federal regulatory scheme." Id. at 245, 247. See also
Comment, supra at 796 n.62. For the development of the preemption doctrine see
Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARv. L. Rav. 1297 (1954); Di Fede,
Problems of Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor-Management Disputes, 11 N.Y.U.
CONF. ON LABOR 85 (1958); Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdic-
tion Over Labor Relations: 1, 59 CoLuar. L. Rav. 6 (1959); Ratner, Problems of
Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor Relations, 3 LAB. L.J. 750 (1952); Smith, The Taft-
*Hartley Act and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations, 46 MicH. L. REv. 593 (1948).
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